Google Project Zero shortens vulnerability disclosure window, drops patch buffer

Eirik Nordvik8 min lesetid
A security engineer reviews software update timelines and a patch deployment dashboard in an office.

On Friday, 13 November 2026, Google’s Project Zero announced a new vulnerability-disclosure policy that removes the extra 30-day patch “soak” period it had used since 2021. Under the new “Full X” schedule, reported vulnerabilities are disclosed after 90 days now, after 60 days from 2 February 2027, and after 30 days from 3 January 2028. The group says AI-assisted discovery and patch analysis have shortened the time defenders can rely on secrecy. For software teams, the change puts more weight on fast remediation and getting fixes installed—not simply making a patch available.

From 90 days plus a month to one clock

Project Zero’s previous policy gave a vendor up to 90 days to address a reported vulnerability, followed by an additional 30 days before details were made public. That second period was intended to give users time to receive and install a patch after it shipped. It was often called “soak time.”

The new policy replaces those two intervals with a single deadline measured from the date Project Zero reports the vulnerability to the vendor. Under Full 90, disclosure follows 90 days after that report. The deadline is scheduled to shorten to 60 days on 2 February 2027 and to 30 days on 3 January 2028.

This is Project Zero’s policy for vulnerabilities it reports. It is not a law or a universal rule binding every security researcher, vendor or bug-bounty program. Other organizations may adopt different timelines, and their terms should be checked separately.

Why Project Zero says the buffer no longer helps

Project Zero says large language models have raised the speed and likelihood of vulnerability discovery and exploitation. It also argues that attackers can increasingly study a released patch to infer the underlying flaw, making a post-fix secrecy period less useful. The team describes near-immediate patch-to-exploit analysis as a reasonable, though imperfect, model of attacker behavior—not as a claim that every fix will be exploited instantly.

A separate issue is the “patch gap”: the time between a vendor releasing a fix and an organization actually installing it. Removing the soak period does not close that gap. It makes the gap more visible. A patch that exists but sits in a queue, waits for a maintenance window or has not reached managed devices may leave users exposed even when the vendor has completed its work.

Project Zero also says its own reporting volume has grown to several vulnerabilities a week in areas where it previously found a few a year. It argues that case-by-case negotiations over whether a vulnerability is fixed or qualifies for a grace period have become difficult to manage at that volume.

What changes for software vendors

The new schedule creates a clearer date for public disclosure, but it does not guarantee that every bug will be repaired before that date. A vendor may need to ship a fix, provide a mitigation or explain that remediation is still in progress. Customers should not assume that the policy itself guarantees a patch.

Project Zero says it will continue tracking whether vulnerabilities are fixed and communicating when they are not, but that status will no longer determine the disclosure date. The policy also removes most former special cases, including the general grace-period and variant rules. The announced exceptions cover vulnerabilities actively exploited in the wild, details already made public by others, and cases where the vendor requests disclosure. Google says rare exceptions may still be granted, including for hardware issues.

For product teams, the practical challenge is operational: security reports need a clear owner, a way to assess affected versions, a tested release path and a means to deliver urgent updates. Teams that normally wait for a scheduled monthly release may need a separate process for serious issues. That does not mean every report should trigger an emergency release; it does mean the decision and escalation path should be ready before a deadline is close.

The difficult trade-off behind a shorter deadline

Project Zero says it consulted vendors that receive many of its reports. Their concern was that moving immediately to a much shorter deadline could expose users to vulnerabilities that vendors had not yet fixed, while also encouraging teams to prioritize a less severe report simply because its disclosure date was nearer. Some vendors worried that deadlines they could not meet might cause them to give up on meeting them.

The staged timetable is the group’s response to those concerns. It aims to press for faster remediation while giving organizations time to improve their processes. Whether the transition produces faster fixes or changes prioritization is not yet established; the announcement sets out concerns, not measured results.

Project Zero also says vulnerability severity will not change its disclosure clock. Severity remains relevant to a vendor’s risk assessment and response, but it will not extend the policy deadline. This distinction may require teams to track two things separately: their internal remediation priority and the date by which public disclosure is expected.

What IT teams should review now

Organizations can start by measuring their own patch gap for critical software: how long it takes to test, approve and deploy a security update after a vendor releases it. The average can hide the most important exceptions, so it is useful to examine internet-facing systems, browsers, operating systems, identity tools and infrastructure separately.

Teams should also check that they can identify where a product is deployed, including older versions and systems managed by suppliers. A complete asset inventory helps determine which machines need a fix when an advisory arrives. If immediate patching is not safe or possible, the organization should know who can approve temporary mitigations—such as restricting access or disabling an exposed feature—and how those controls will be removed once the fix is installed.

For procurement and service owners, a useful question is how each supplier communicates serious vulnerabilities, ships emergency fixes and supports customers while a fix is being prepared. The announced Full 60 date in February 2027 is a concrete planning marker for teams whose products or dependencies fall within Project Zero’s reporting scope.

A disclosure policy is not a patching plan

The change reflects Project Zero’s view that a quiet period no longer provides the same protection it once did. It does not establish that every attacker uses AI, that every patch can be reverse-engineered immediately, or that every vulnerability will be disclosed before a fix exists. Those uncertainties remain important.

What is clear is the direction of travel for this one research team: a single, shorter disclosure clock, fewer negotiated exceptions and no additional month reserved for patch rollout. Vendors will need to manage fixes and customer communication against that clock; organizations will need to shorten the time between receiving a fix and putting it into service. A disclosure schedule can set a deadline. Only operational readiness can turn that deadline into protection.

Om Eirik Nordvik

Eirik skriver om forbrukerteknologi, mobil og nettsikkerhet for Smartpage. Han er opptatt av å forklare hva teknologinyhetene betyr i praksis – uten hype og uten sjargong.